aBStraCt: this paper is about the dispositional difference that demonstrative and indexical beliefs make. More specifically, it is about the dispositional difference between my believing that nn is P (where i am nn) and my believing that i, myself, am P. identifying a dispositional difference in this kind of case is especially challenging because those beliefs have the very same truth conditions. My question is this: how can a difference in belief that makes no difference to one's conception of the world nonetheless make a difference to one's actions and reactions? i will argue that the dispositions associated with indexical beliefs are best of thought of as like belief revision policies: they make no difference to the content of our conception of the world, but they govern how we can change and revise that conception, and in so doing contribute to making rational action possible. seeing all of this will help us to better understand how it is that first-person indexical beliefs manifest self-consciousness.
eliefs can make a difference to psychological explanation only if they make a dispositional difference. only if what one believes makes a difference to how one would act and react in various situations could a difference in belief be relevant to explaining or understanding what a person does. this paper is about the dispositional difference that indexical beliefs make. More specifically, it is about the dispositional difference between my believing that nn is P (where i am nn) and my believing that i, myself, am P. identifying a dispositional difference in this kind of case is especially challenging because those beliefs have the very same truth conditions. My question is this: how can a difference in belief that makes no difference to one's conception of the world nonetheless make a difference to one's actions and reactions? i will argue that the dispositions associated with indexical beliefs are best of thought of as like belief revision policies: they make no difference play an essential role in explaining and understanding human action. in section iv, i develop the idea that demonstrative beliefs are associated with dispositions to revise one's map of the world in certain ways, and i suggest that seeing this can help us to understand why such beliefs are so closely tied to self-consciousness, and so to part of what makes rational human action possible.
i. arMStrOnG anD SinGuLar BeLieFS
Armstrong's claim that singular beliefs are not dispositions might sound surprising, since it might seem that a dispositionalist about belief could plausibly say that to believe that a is P is to be disposed to act and react as if a is P. one might even expand on this a bit by saying that it is, inter alia, to be disposed to assume that a is P when reasoning, to react with surprise if presented with evidence that a is not P, to act in practical matters as if a is P, and so on. indeed, this is precisely what Gilbert Ryle and H. H. Price, among others, said about singular belief (Price 1969; Ryle 1949) . But Armstrong had several reasons for denying that singular beliefs are dispositions.
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He developed these reasons by contrasting singular beliefs with the disposition of brittleness, which he took to be a kind of paradigm disposition. First, he held that unlike brittleness, singular beliefs have no triggering conditions. second, he held that unlike brittleness, singular beliefs are states with a complex internal structure. Last, and this is the point that will interest us, unlike brittleness, singular beliefs lack a logically central manifestation. this third claim is at the heart of his disagreement with Ryle and Price, on the one side, and with Kraemer, on the other. in effect, Armstrong argued as follows:
(1) Dispositions have logically central manifestations.
(2) singular beliefs have no logically central manifestations.
(3) so, singular beliefs are not dispositions.
Ryle and Price in effect denied premise (1), while Kraemer denied premise (2) . in this section i will be concerned with understanding what Armstrong means by premise (1), and with why he thinks it is true.
Armstrong's notion of a logically central manifestation is more than a bit elusive. in one place, he characterizes it in epistemic terms, as a matter of how we are able to characterize or identify the manifestation.
Anyone who understands the term "brittle" understands what the manifestation of brittleness is: breaking when struck. But, at the same time, the notion of 'breaking when struck' can be understood without making any reference to the notion of brittleness. the notion of brittleness can be introduced as that state of an object which is responsible for the manifestation of breaking when struck.
By contrast, the characteristic manifestations of a [singular] belief can only be identified as manifestations of the belief by reference back to the belief. (Armstrong 1973, 17) this characterization of the notion of a logically central manifestation makes it seem to be about reducibility, about whether a state's manifestation can be identified or characterized without reference to that state. But it is not clear why reduction is relevant to a debate over whether singular beliefs are dispositions, since dispositionalism about belief need not be viewed as reductivist in this sense, and neither Ryle nor Price viewed it in this way. it is true that Armstrong and some other proponents of a dispositional view of belief held or came to hold a functionalist version of it, on which beliefs are states of the brain or of the central nervous system that play a distinctive causal role. on this view, a belief is identical with whatever neural state plays the appropriate causal role. Making good on this view might require being able to specify the dispositional role without reference to other beliefs or mental states. But this functionalist version of dispositionalism is not mandatory, and is not the version either Price or Ryle had in mind. A dispositional conception of belief-one that holds that to believe that P is to be disposed to treat the world as if it were the case that P and which insists that there can be no difference in belief without a difference in dispositions-can be insightful without being reductive if it clarifies the similarities and differences between different kinds of mental attitudes and the relations between these attitudes and action. Demonstrative beliefs are of special interest because of their apparently close ties with agency. i return to these ties below.
in another place, Armstrong characterizes the difference between brittleness and singular belief in terms of the number of a state's manifestations.
if brittleness is manifested, it can be manifested in only one sort of way: by the brittle object breaking if struck. But there is no one such way that a belief that the earth is flat must manifest itself, if it does manifest itself. For instance, the manifestation need not take the form of outer or inner assent. (Armstrong 1973, 17) this suggests that Armstrong meant that a state has a logically central manifestation only if it has but one possible manifestation. But as Alston has noted, a brittle object will manifest its brittleness differently, depending on, among other factors, how hard it is struck and the direction of the strike (Alston 1971). indeed, as Alston argues, there are an infinite number of possible manifestations of a vase's brittleness, one for each possible magnitude of force with which it is struck, and another for each possible angle of the strike's incidence. nor need every manifestation involve the vase's shattering. testing might reveal patterns of low frequency vibration that manifest its brittleness even though it does not shatter. since it is hard to see why Armstrong would have denied any of this, i will assume that by a logically central manifestation he had something else in mind.
Perhaps it is a matter of having only one kind of manifestation, so that the relevant difference between brittleness and singular belief is that whereas brittleness has only behavioral manifestations, singular beliefs have behavioral, phenomenological and cognitive manifestations? the fact that Jones believes that the earth is flat might be manifested in his asserting that it is, in his being surprised by evidence that it is not, and in his deducing from it that the earth is not cubical. Both Ryle and Price agree that singular beliefs have manifestations of many different kinds.
Dispositional words like 'know,' 'believe,' 'aspire,' 'clever' and 'humorous' are determinable dispositional words. they signify abilities, tendencies or pronenesses to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds. theorists who recognize that 'know' and 'believe' are commonly used as dispositional verbs are apt not to notice this point, but to assume that there must be corresponding acts of knowing or apprehending and states of believing. (Ryle 1949, 118) [t]he miscellaneous character of belief-manifestations is one of the most interesting and important things about them. if A holds some belief, many different sorts of happenings in A's history, both overt happenings and purely private and introspectible ones, are tied together or made explicable by the fact that he holds it. if the Dispositional Analysis of belief is correct, believing must be a multiform disposition. (Price 1969, 295-296) But it is hard to see why having many kinds of manifestations should prevent a state's being a disposition. What is more, one might think that brittleness itself has phenomenological and cognitive manifestations, as well as purely behavioral ones, since if a brittle vase is struck, then not only would it break but a well-placed observer would see it break and would come to believe that it has broken. Admittedly, these effects of the shattering require a conscious subject, but it remains true that the vase's fragility involves its having these effects. Perhaps not all dispositions have cognitive and phenomenological manifestations, though it is not unreasonable to hold that they must if we are to know of them.
2 But whatever the facts of this issue, there is another reason to doubt that Armstrong meant by having a logically central manifestation having manifestations of only one kind. He took general beliefs to have logically central manifestations even though he allowed that they can be manifested in other ways, such as by being expressed in words (Armstrong 1973, 18; see also 90) . Perhaps Armstrong's idea is that a logically central manifestation of a state is one whose absence is incompatible with the presence of that state. Plausibly, a thing that won't shatter when struck under normal conditions is not brittle. Perhaps Armstrong's point is that there is no one manifestation such that its absence is incompatible with, say, believing that the earth is flat. eric schwitzgebel accepts this point about belief in general. on his view, having a given belief is a matter of having most of the dispositions associated with that belief. But, he says, "[n]o one disposition is either necessary or sufficient for the possession of any belief" (schwitzgebel 2002, 252) .
that this is what Armstrong has in mind by the notion of a logically central manifestation is supported by the fact that in making the case that general beliefs do have logically central manifestations, he claims that general beliefs do have a manifestation that is essential in this sense. General beliefs, he held, are "'habits of inference' which dispose us to move from a belief about some particular matter of fact to a further belief about some particular matter of fact. General beliefs are dispositions to extend the original belief-map according to certain rules" (Armstrong 1973, 5) . Anyone who believes that all ss are Ps is disposed to come to believe that a is P upon coming to believe that a is s. Having this disposition is like having a standing policy or rule that directs how to extend or revise one's conception of the facts under different conditions. in his example: anyone who believes that arsenic is poisonous will be prepared or disposed to come to believe that some portion of stuff is poisonous upon coming to believe that that stuff is arsenic. General beliefs are thus like attitudes to one's conception of the world, as opposed to elements of its content. Because he held that general beliefs have this role, Armstrong was prepared to say that general beliefs are dispositions: they are dispositions to form singular beliefs. in terms of the map analogy, while singular beliefs are like details on the map, the details that do the representing, general beliefs are like dispositions to change the map. i will assume, in what follows, that this is what Armstrong had in mind by the notion of a logically central manifestation.
so far as i can see, debate over the truth of premise (1), over whether to be a disposition a state must have a logically central manifestation, is largely terminological, a debate about how to use the word 'disposition.' there are two reasons to think this. to see the first one, suppose that a dispositionalist was to respond to Armstrong that the logically central manifestation of the belief that the earth is flat is simply to be disposed to act and react as if the earth is flat, that anyone who did not act and react in that way would lack that belief. Why couldn't this count as the logically central manifestation? Armstrong might object to this on the grounds that this characterization of the manifestation is too close in meaning to the way we characterize the belief itself. But this reply is beside the point, unless Armstrong's point is the reductionist one i earlier said is not relevant to the debate. there is no good reason to think that relations among the concepts we use to think about or describe a state need reveal anything about the underlying nature of that state, and in particular there is no reason to think that those conceptual relations are themselves relevant to the question whether the state is a disposition.
A second reason to think that the debate over the truth of premise (1) is largely terminological concerns the fact that the notion of a disposition is the notion of how a thing would act and change under various conditions, of which subjunctive conditionals are true of it. Given this, a disagreement about a thing's dispositions ought, one might think, to be a disagreement over which such conditionals are true of it. But Armstrong's disagreement with Ryle and Price is not about this at all, since all sides might well agree on how an agent who believes that the earth is flat would act and react in different situations, about all the possible behavioral, phenomenological and cognitive manifestations of that belief, and still Armstrong would disagree with them about what dispositions that agent has. this suggests that the debate is about how to use the word 'disposition' in describing some phenomena, and not about the nature of the phenomena being described.
still, William Lyons has argued that a state whose manifestations bear only a rough family resemblance to one another would not be useful in explaining or predicting behavior, whether we decide to call that state a disposition or not.
in the first place a disposition which is determinable in so far as the only factor which is common to the episodes it is parasitic upon is a vague family resemblance is stretching to the limit the logic of dispositions so that such dispositions will be difficult to establish. For it is well nigh impossible to build up evidence that someone has a proneness to do x in circumstances y if x is really a loosely related conglomerate of activities m, n, o, p, q, and r, which in turn will make y a highly varied and so ill-defined context; and this difficulty in building up evidence about the proneness itself makes it equally hard to predict future occurrences of the disposition itself seeing that it is well nigh impossible to decide if the ill-defined concept of context y is now instantiated and, given that it is, to decide whether it is m, or n or p or q or r that we should expect to see. (Lyons 1973, 332-333) Lyons illustrates the point with the example of being disposed to play games, whose manifestations are related to one another only by a family resemblance, since games themselves are related in that way. it seems right, in general, that a disposition of the kind Lyons describes would be of only limited use in theories that aim to predict and explain phenomena. it might be too difficult to determine whether someone is a game-player, if the manifestations are so loosely related one to another. And knowing that someone is a game-player might be of little help in predicting or understanding her actions, if there is too much diversity in what a game-player would do in different situations.
3 in general, then, Lyons' cautions seem appropriate. But it does not follow from these points that things do not have such "determinable" dispositions. Moreover, while it might be right that being disposed to play games is not a state that will figure prominently in psychological explanations, it is hard to deny that belief ascriptions have proven to be very useful in predicting and explaining behavior.
4 of course, there are some beliefs whose correct ascription is both difficult to verify and of little predictive value. And there are cases of agents with dispositions that are not easily categorized in the belief-desire framework. But some dispositionalists consider these features of that framework to be strengths and not weaknesses, and insist that this very flexibility helps us to understand why belief ascription is such an effective tool in explaining and predicting behavior (schwitzgebel 2002, 253; Price 1969) . so while Lyon's point is correct as a general methodological caution, it is not sufficient reason to doubt that singular beliefs can be explanatorily helpful even if they lack logically central manifestations.
ii. LOGiCaLLY CentraL ManiFeStatiOnS
i have been discussing premise (1) in Armstrong's argument for the claim that singular beliefs are not dispositions. in response to the argument, eric Kraemer denies premise (2), the claim that singular beliefs lack a logically central manifestation. Understood in the way suggested above, this comes to the claim that there is no manifestation of that belief whose absence is incompatible with having that belief. i have already noted that some dispositionalists (e.g., eric schwitzgebel) do seem to accept this claim, and so Kraemer's rejection of it is worth study. Kraemer argues that singular beliefs do have logically central manifestations, and that these manifestations involve the formation of demonstrative beliefs: to believe that a is P is to be disposed to believe that that is P upon coming to believe that that is a. to believe that nn is F is to be disposed to believe that I, myself, am F (or that he is F) upon coming to believe that I, myself, am (or that he is) nn. i believe that he is wrong about this, though i think that seeing why can help us to better understand the dispositional nature of demonstrative belief.
the idea of a demonstrative belief is subtle. For it is part of the idea that a demonstrative belief does not differ in truth conditional content from the associated singular belief but does (as we will see below) make a dispositional difference. 5 the singular belief that a is F and the demonstrative belief that that (pointing at a) is F (or that i am F, when i am a) do not differ in their truth conditions. in this sense, demonstrative beliefs add nothing to one's map of the world that is not already added by the truth conditionally equivalent singular belief. But demonstrative beliefs are supposed to make a difference to how one steers by one's map. it is this feature of demonstrative beliefs-that they are truth conditionally redundant and yet dispositionally potent-that makes them philosophically interesting.
one might think that the distinctions at issue are not among kinds of belief at all, but rather among ways of expressing, acquiring or sustaining a singular belief or among the states that accompany belief. More specifically, one might think that so-called demonstrative belief is simply a singular belief caused by an occurrent awareness of the individual the belief is about, so that one could not believe that his (pointing at me) pants are on fire without perceiving me, whereas one could well believe that nn's pants are on fire without having ever seen me. if these cases differ, not in the belief itself, but only in some other way, then an account like Kraemer' s that attempts to analyze non-demonstrative singular belief in terms of demonstrative belief will risk being circular in an unhelpful way, since it would analyze singular belief in terms of singular beliefs. But Kraemer is in good company in taking the distinctions between singular belief, on one hand, and demonstrative and indexical belief, on the other, to mark real differences among kinds of belief. Making good on this requires identifying the dispositional difference between having one of these beliefs and having another. What, in other words, is the dispositional difference between believing that a is F and believing that that (pointing to a) is F, or that i, myself, am F?
Kraemer models his analysis of singular belief on the one Armstrong, following Ramsey, gave of general beliefs. Having a general belief is being disposed to revise or extend one's map of the world in certain ways under certain conditions. to believe that all ss are Ps is to be disposed to come to believe that a is P upon coming to believe that a is s. since this manifestation is a cognitive one, as opposed to a phenomenological or behavioral one, this analysis holds that general belief is a cognitive disposition.
i have my doubts about the merits of this analysis of general belief. For one thing, it is not true for all kinds of general beliefs. Armstrong seems to treat all general beliefs as categorical beliefs, as of the form "All ss are Ps." But the generic belief that dogs have four legs is not the same as the categorical belief that all dogs have four legs. one can believe that dogs have four legs, and come to believe that three-legged spot is a dog, without coming to believe that spot has four legs. this kind of case indicates that the analysis is at best incomplete, or of narrower application than advertised.
But there is a deeper difficulty with the analysis. Coming to believe that a is s might, in certain cases, lead me to abandon my belief that all ss are Ps, as opposed to leading me to believe that a is P. i might, for instance, abandon my belief that all bachelors are happy upon coming to believe that Jones, whom i took to be a miserable husband, is in fact a miserable bachelor. so, one can have that belief without being disposed to manifest it in that way. the reason, of course, is that my beliefs interact with other beliefs to produce behavior, feelings or other mental states, and this is just as true of general beliefs as it is of singular beliefs. As Price put the point:
[i]f we consider our mental attitude to inductive generalizations, it seems obvious that we assent to them, or dissent from them, in just the same way as we assent or dissent to singular empirical propositions. in fact, we believe them (or disbelieve them) in just the same way as we believe or disbelieve other empirical propositions. (Price 1969, 182) this example depends on the general belief's being contingent, and one might object that an example with a necessarily true general belief might not work as well. Perhaps it is true that anyone who believes that all bachelors are males will, upon coming to believe of anyone that he is a bachelor also come to believe that he is a male. But even if this is true, it merely points out a second bit of false advertising: the analysis applies (if it does) only to belief in necessarily true categorical generalizations, and not, as advertised, to all general belief. in any event, Kraemer's analysis of singular belief merely uses that analysis of general belief as a model, and does not depend on its being true. on his view, singular beliefs are fundamentally a kind of cognitive disposition. even though he allows that believing that a is P might have both behavioral and phenomenological manifestations, it has a logically central manifestation and it is a cognitive one. to believe that a is P, he says, is to be disposed to believe that that is P upon coming to believe that that is a. to believe that nn is P is to be disposed to believe that I, myself, am P upon coming to believe that I, myself, am nn. this would be a cognitive disposition: a disposition to come to have a certain demonstrative belief.
i have the same reservations about this analysis as i had about the analysis of general beliefs. First, it is not in general true, at least not if, as seems plausible, one can have singular beliefs about objects one cannot have demonstrative beliefs about. i can have singular beliefs about numbers, but it is not clear that i can have demonstrative beliefs about them, since there is no clear sense in which i can point out or otherwise demonstrate the numbers. i can also have singular beliefs about Caesar, though i cannot have demonstrative beliefs about him. this suggests that the analysis is incomplete or of narrower scope than advertised.
But the following example indicates deeper difficulties. i currently believe that Jacques Chirac is in europe. According to Kraemer's account, if i now acquire a demonstrative belief with respect to some person that he is Chirac, i will come acquire a demonstrative belief with respect to him that he is in europe. But suppose that Chirac suddenly showed up in my office, but that i did not at first recognize him. in short order, though, i do recognize him and yell to my office mate: "Look! that's Chirac!" it seems that i express here a demonstrative belief to the effect that that person is Chirac. But this will prompt me to abandon my belief that Chirac is in europe, not to acquire the demonstrative belief that the person i am looking at is in europe. What else a person comes to believe upon acquiring new information depends on what else he believes. in this case, how i revise or extend my conception of the world depends on what i believe about my own continental location, and how strongly i believe it. the manifestation Kraemer claims to be necessary for having that belief is not, in fact, necessary.
to summarize this section: Kraemer argued that singular beliefs are cognitive dispositions to acquire demonstrative beliefs. i have been arguing that his analysis is mistaken. i do not think that for a state to be a disposition it must have a logically central manifestation. But i have not denied that singular beliefs are dispositions. in fact, it seems to me quite plausible to say that to believe that a is P just is to be disposed to act, react and feel as if a is P. But Kraemer also holds that demonstrative beliefs are not dispositions. i turn now to this claim.
iii. DeMOnStrative BeLieFS anD PSYCHOLOGiCaL eXPLanatiOn
the claim that demonstrative beliefs are not dispositions fits badly with the commonly held view that demonstrative beliefs are essential to explaining or understanding human action. if the difference between my believing that nn is P and my believing that i, myself, am P (where i am nn) makes no dispositional difference, then it would seem that that difference in belief could make no difference to explaining or understanding what i do. Kraemer agrees with the common view that demonstrative beliefs are essential to explaining human action, but sees no way to make sense of demonstrative beliefs as dispositions.
Kraemer accepts that demonstrative beliefs are essential to explaining or understanding human action. "Without such beliefs," he held, "one cannot satisfactorily explain human action" (Kraemer 1985, 172) . in accepting this, Kraemer is part of a healthy philosophical tradition. in explaining why he introduced the idea of an "essential indexical," John Perry (whom Kraemer draws on) relates three stories and writes: in these three cases, the subjects in explaining their actions would use indexicals to characterize certain beliefs they came to have. these indexicals are essential, in that replacement of them by other terms destroys the force of the explanation, or at least requires certain assumptions to be made to preserve it. (Perry 2000, 28; emphasis added) More recently, David velleman writes the following. now, a cat is conscious, i assume, and it has the sort of consciousness whose content can be put into words only with the help of the first person pronoun. A cat could never catch a mouse if it didn't have thoughts representing the world from its own egocentric perspective, thoughts with english-language equivalents such as "i'm gaining on it" or "i've got it." (velleman 2007, xv) though these passages express agreement that demonstrative and indexical beliefs play an important role in agency, they point to quite different explanatory roles.
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A less radical role is that a first-person belief is needed only for s's doing X to be intentional or rational. on this idea, s might still have done X in the absence of that first person belief but in that case s's doing it would not have been an action (in some proper sense) or would have been in some way irrational or non-rational. this is the role suggested by Perry's remark that in the absence of the first person belief the explanation of the event would lose its "force," which suggests (to me anyway) that the event might still have occurred, but that it would then need to be explained in some other way, relying on "other assumptions." But Kraemer and velleman suggest a more radical idea: that in the absence of the first person belief, s would not have done X at all (and not just because X is essentially intentional). on this view, first-person beliefs make a difference to what happens, and not just to the rational or intentional character of what happens. i will assume that what is at issue is the more radical and more interesting doctrine.
First-person belief can make such a difference to what happens and to our understanding of agency only if it makes a difference to an agent's dispositions. only if knowing where she is on her map of the world makes a difference to her dispositions can Jane's belief that she, herself is in London make a difference to what she does, over and above her belief that Jane smith is in London. An account of the difference that does not make clear the dispositional difference is thus incomplete at best. some philosophers have tried to distinguish demonstrative beliefs from the truth conditionally equivalent singular beliefs in terms of their propositional contents, arguing that demonstrative beliefs have a unique kind of content. the idea is that the singular belief that Chirac is in europe differs from the demonstrative belief that he (where it is Chirac being demonstrated) is in europe, or from the (indexical) de se belief that Chirac might have that he, himself is in europe, not in terms of truth conditions, since these beliefs are truth-conditionally equivalent, but in that the demonstrative and de se beliefs involve a demonstrative mode of awareness or Fregean sense. this is not the place to consider these proposals in detail. My point is simply that unless those proposals are accompanied with an account of the dispositional difference between demonstrative and singular belief, they are incomplete and throw no light on how it can be that such beliefs are essential to agency. 7 this is why it is important to know whether Kraemer's pessimism is warranted, i.e., whether there is little hope of finding a dispositional difference between believing that a is P and believing that that is P or that I, myself, am P. Kraemer agrees with Armstrong that a genuine disposition must have a logically central manifestation. He argues that demonstrative beliefs are not dispositions by arguing that they lack such manifestations. the argument proceeds by considering whether the disposition associated with a demonstrative belief might be modeled on the one suggested for both general and singular beliefs, as follows: to believe that that is P is to be disposed to come to believe that this is P upon coming to believe that this is that. He rejects this analysis on the grounds that it is quite obscure what the belief that this is that might amount to, and because the analysis makes reference to a demonstrative belief and so is circular in an unhelpful way. All of this seems to me to be right. Kraemer concludes with the following: so some other elements are needed to provide a dispositional account of demonstrative belief. the question that i now see no way of answering is: what sorts of elements might these be? For it seems clear that no purely behavioral (single-track) dispositional account will do. And there is no obvious non-circular dispositional account in terms of mental items which will work any better. (Kraemer 1985, 173) i agree with Kraemer that the prospects are not bright of providing a purely behavioral or phenomenological account of the dispositions involved in demonstrative belief. i am also ready to agree with him that there is no hope of providing a noncircular analysis of demonstrative belief that treats it as a disposition to form a further demonstrative belief. However, i think that there is another possibility that Kraemer does not consider. Perhaps demonstrative beliefs (as both Armstrong and Kraemer thought is true of general beliefs) express epistemic policies as opposed to cognitive attitudes.
iv. BeLieF reviSiOn
the map analogy can help us to see two ways in which there is a dispositional difference associated with demonstrative beliefs. i will discuss two such differences. Both are dispositions concerning belief revision; both are agent-specific, in that no two agents have the very same ones; and both are naturally viewed as expressing or manifesting self-consciousness. the first concerns a limit to the revisions an agent can make to her conception of the world: no agent can revise her conception of the world in such a way as to remove herself from it. the second concerns under what conditions an agent can revise her beliefs about her own location and surroundings: only she can revise (some of) what her map says about herself and her surroundings without relying on observation, testimony or any other kind of evidence. i think that exercise of these agent specific, belief-revision dispositions constitutes part of the self-consciousness manifested in demonstrative and (most especially) first person belief. in this section i will describe these dispositions and show that they lie behind demonstrative beliefs. i will conclude by sketching the role they play in making human intentional action possible. the idea that demonstrative beliefs, and first person beliefs in particular, manifest, or are associated with, self-consciousness is nothing new. For an agent to steer by her map of the world, she must know who she is on that map. she must know which of the agents that there are in her conception of the world she is. it can easily seem that in the absence of this additional information-self-consciousness about who she is in the world as she takes it to be-she cannot possibly act. some philosophers hold that an agent could have a fully accurate conception of the world while lacking any self-consciousness in this sense. David Lewis, most famously, considers an omniscient God who wonders who he is (Lewis 1983 ). i will suggest below that this imagined lack of self-consciousness is not a genuine possibility. But for now i want only to note that demonstrative beliefs are usually taken to ground or constitute this self-knowledge. My belief that i, myself, am P is supposed to locate me among the agents that i believe there are in a way that my belief that nn is P cannot; and my belief that this is P is supposed to locate me in relation to the objects that i believe there are in the world in a way that my belief that a is P cannot. By being self-locating, demonstrative beliefs constitute a kind of selfconsciousness that is supposed to be necessary for action.
i said that no agent can revise her conception of the world in such a way as to remove herself from it. to see this, let's first note a limit to an agent's possible belief. An agent cannot believe that the world does not contain herself. i cannot believe that i do not exist. i can recognize that the world might have been that way, that my parents might never have met and so on, and others can believe the world to be that way, but i cannot. this means that among the ways that the world might have been some are ways that i can believe it to be, but others are not; some possible worlds are believable-by-me worlds, and others are not, even though i recognize the latter as genuine possibilities. the important point for my purposes is that the set of worlds that are believable-by-me is unique to me, and the set of worlds that are believable-by-you is unique to you. Putting the point picturesquely, we might say that this set of believable-by-me worlds singles out my perspective on the world by marking the limits of that perspective: my perspective is the one from which nn exists in every world that is believable from that perspective. your perspective on the world is the one from which you exist in every world that is believable from it. such a limit is essential to belief and is unique to each believer: there is a limit for each believer and no two believers share a limit.
this difference from one agent to another in the limits of their possible belief does not correspond to a difference in what the agents believe about the world. For this difference remains even among agents who agree on how things are-that is, even when the maps by which they steer say the very same things. in particular, the attitude in my case is not the same as my belief that i exist, since anyone else can believe that too. My taking a map to be a map of my world is not a matter of my having some information about the world or about me or about my location in that world. the difference in our individual limits corresponds, not to a difference in what we believe, but to a difference in which agent each of us is. though this difference in limit from agent to agent does not correspond to a difference in what is believed, it does correspond to a difference in how agents are disposed to revise their beliefs. you, for instance, can be disposed to revise your map in such a way that it no longer represents me (or my location). you may come to believe that i do not exist, or that i never did exist. But i lack that disposition, because making that revision to my conception of the world is beyond the limits of my belief. i can be disposed to make various other sorts of changes to my beliefs, but not that one. this difference in our dispositions to revise our beliefs does not correspond to a difference in our beliefs about the world, and in particular, it does not correspond to the belief that my existence is contingent, since we both believe that. Rather, it corresponds to the fact that my non-existence is beyond belief for me, but not for you. And, again, this difference persists even when our maps say the very same thing. this limit to possible belief revision is one way in which an agent's conception of the world involves self-consciousness: my conception of the world is essentially about me in a way that your conception of the world is not, and this difference persists even if you and i agree on the facts.
A second dispositional difference between agents concerns the way that each is disposed to revise her beliefs about herself and her relations to her observable surroundings. the point develops Anscombe's idea that an agent's beliefs about her own location and intentional activity are not based on observation, testimony or inference in the way that her beliefs about someone else's location and activity are (Anscombe 1963). As i sit here, i am looking at my computer screen, and i believe that i am. My belief that i am looking at that (pointing at my computer screen) is not based on observation. My beliefs about the thing that i am looking at (e.g., that it is now turned on, that it has a black frame, etc.) are based on observation i make, but my belief that i am looking at it is not. i do not need to observe myself in order to form beliefs about what i am looking at. My wife is also working in this same room, and her belief that i am looking at the computer screen is based on her observations of me. she has to look at me, or rely on what i tell her, or reason from her detailed knowledge of my habits, to her belief that i am looking at it. As i turn my head and look out the window, my belief about what i am looking at changes, but that change in belief is not based on observation. it is not that i observe a change in what i am looking at. But my wife's change in belief, as she comes to believe that i am now staring out the window, is based on observation. Unlike me, she sees me looking out the window, and this observation prompts her to change her beliefs about what i am looking at. the conditions under which i will change my beliefs about my position and about my relation to surrounding objects are not the same as those under which she will change her beliefs about these things. this is so even though she and i are in complete agreement about these issues.
the point is not one about what justifies the belief revision, or whether the belief revision is infallible or incorrigible. i will set aside the question of justification. But the kinds of revisions i am discussing are not infallible or incorrigible, though they may have a certain sort of authority. though i may be wrong about what i am looking at, and may correct my beliefs on the basis of testimony or ordinary observation, my conception of my own perceptual relations to objects might be authoritative in the sense of being the first word on the subject, if not always the last or best word.
And of course, i am related to objects in countless ways that i am not even aware of, and so which do not figure into my conception of the world. My present point is simply that an agent is disposed to revise (some of) her beliefs about her own location and about her relation to surrounding objects in a way that others are not and that it is not the way she is disposed to revise her beliefs about other people's relations to those same objects. it is natural to think of this disposition as a kind of self-consciousness, not in the sense of an occurrent awareness, but in the sense of an enduring tendency. in making such revisions to her conception of the world an agent is manifesting a consciousness of herself that no other agent has.
this point about self-consciousness is not restricted to revisions in an agent's beliefs about her own movements and her relations to observable objects, but extends also to revisions in her beliefs about her own activity, though here the story is more complex. Anscombe and others held that an agent knows her own intentional activity without reliance on observation, testimony or inference.
8 Part of the story is that an agent is doing something intentionally only if she believes that she is, at least in cases of basic actions.
9 the fact that i am now typing depends, in part, on the fact that i believe that i am, but in a constitutive and not a causal way.
10 My conception of my own intentional activity is part of what makes it the intentional activity it is. if my wife was to point out that i am keeping the baby awake with my typing, i could correctly reply that i was not doing it on purpose. i was doing it, but not intentionally, and part of the reason for this is that i did not believe that i was doing it. An agent's beliefs about her own actions are part of what make them the actions that they are. this is not the place to defend or even develop this story. i want to assume it, in order to make a related point about belief revision.
Assuming that this Anscombian view of self-knowledge is right, it would seem that an agent's dispositions to revise her beliefs about her own intentional activity are not the dispositions she has to revise her beliefs about other people's intentional activities. prompts belief revision, and not about the justification, infallibility or incorrigibility of that revision. An agent's conception of her own intentional activity changes and adjusts in ways that her conception of other people's activities does not. As before, it is natural to think of this disposition as a kind of self-consciousness, not in the sense of an occurrent awareness, but in the sense of an enduring tendency. in making such revisions to her conception of the world an agent is manifesting a consciousness of herself that no other agent has.
i have described two kinds of dispositions to belief revision that i claim are different from one agent to another and i have suggested that they are naturally thought of as closely related to a kind of self-consciousness. it is also natural, i think, to view this self-consciousness as the one associated with demonstrative belief.
Demonstrative beliefs are supposed to be self-locating beliefs, identifying for me which of the agents i believe there to be is me. For me to believe that I, myself, am nn, and not just that nn is nn (where i am nn), is for nn to be the agent in my conception of the world who will survive any possible revision to that conception. My wife also believes that i am nn, but (sadly) i am revisable from her conception of the world. For me to believe that I, myself, am typing is for me to be disposed to revise (some of) my beliefs about nn's typing (where, again, i am nn) without reliance on observation, testimony or inference. While my wife may believe that nn is typing, she is not disposed to revise that belief in that way. the ordinary use of "i" and of reflexives like "i, myself" is related to this selfconsciousness, but these relations are complex. one reason for this is that not all of my beliefs about myself are governed by this kind of self-consciousness. For example, my beliefs that i was once poisoned in a Chinese restaurant, or that i am now digesting my lunch, are not. they are acquired only through and revised only on the basis of testimony, observation or inference. But i can still use the first-person pronoun to express these beliefs about myself. so the use of the firstperson to express a belief is not sufficient for that belief to be governed by this kind of self-consciousness. But is it required? i think that i could express a belief about myself that is governed in the right way using my proper name. i might now inform my wife as follows: "nn is now looking at the computer screen again." But this sounds odd. But the question is whether it sounds odd because it violates the linguistic conventions of self-reporting (perhaps, that we do not use our names to refer to ourselves), or because it violates some Gricean maxim of communication (perhaps, because i am in a position to make the "stronger" claim that "i am now staring at the computer screen")? this is a subject for further study.
i have identified two kinds of belief-revision dispositions that are unique to each agent and that are naturally associated with differences in their demonstrative beliefs and with a kind of self-consciousness. the differences concern belief revision policies-dispositions to revise one's conception of the world. But one might ask: could having these policies really prevent or remove the imagined uncertainty about oneself that originally motivated the call for special first-person beliefs? if one was genuinely unsure as to which of the agents in one's conception of the world one was, how could having these dispositions help? or worse, what is to prevent an agent from having those dispositions towards some other agent in her conception of the world? Why couldn't my wife be disposed to revise her beliefs about nn's location and activities in the ways that she is in fact disposed to revise her beliefs about her own location and activities? Wouldn't this amount to her taking herself to be me?
11 But if this sort of mistake is possible, then how could merely having these belief-revision policies really help me to locate myself in my map of the world?
i think that this is the point at which the map analogy fails as an account of the nature of belief. For so long as one thinks of having a belief as like having a map of the world, it will seem like a real problem how one can tell both which agent one is and what one is doing. this uncertainty will seem not just possible but inevitable. the reason for this is that central to the map analogy of belief is what Anscombe once derided as the "incorrigibly contemplative conception" of belief (Anscombe 1963, 57) . she urged replacing it with a conception that allowed for what she called 'practical knowledge,' a belief embodied in intention. seeing the incoherence of that imagined uncertainty, and so seeing that there is no further role for first-person demonstrative belief to play, requires recognizing belief as a fundamentally practical attitude and not (or at least not just) a contemplative attitude to the world. i want to end this paper by discussing this point.
Armstrong himself noted that a fundamental difference between having a map and having a belief is that whereas we need to interpret a map of the world, we do not need to interpret our beliefs, for they are our interpretation of the world (Armstrong 1973, 4) . our attitude to maps is thus not quite the same as the attitude to the world involved in belief. And the difference is starkest in the case of beliefs about one's own agency. For while it is possible to be uncertain about where one is in the world, it is not possible to be uncertain about what one is doing, at least not where the doing is intentional, and so not in the cases most closely tied to agency. it is possible for me to be doing something unintentionally (such as spilling sugar from my shopping cart) and yet not know that i am the one doing it, or even that it is happening at all. this is a fact about the limits of belief and not a puzzle or a problem. it is also possible for me to be quite certain that i am doing something (either intentionally or not) and yet not in fact be doing it. i might be quite certain that i am digesting that rubber ball i swallowed or that i am pumping water to the house when in fact i am not doing either thing because the ball is indigestible or the hose has sprung a leak. Believing that i am doing X is not sufficient for it to be the case that i am doing X. But it is necessary, at least when i am doing X intentionally. Agency is on this view incompatible with the imagined uncertainty.
the point is not a causal one. it is not that my intentionally doing X must be caused or somehow sustained by my belief that i am doing X. the point is rather a constitutive one: part of what makes it the case that s is the agent of the event of X-ing is that s's map of the world represents s as X-ing. Anscombe argued, further, that this belief when true counts as knowledge and is justified non-observationally.
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Whatever the merits of this, i am drawing a much more modest moral: because i cannot be uncertain as to what i am intentionally doing, since in that case i would not be intentionally doing it, i cannot be uncertain as to which agent i am in the world as i take it to be. the map analogy of belief breaks down because it makes such uncertainty seem possible, as if i could have a map that represented my own intentional doings and yet not know which doings were mine. But if the uncertainty is not coherent, if there is no such thing as being uncertain as to which events i am the agent of, then special self-locating beliefs-ones that cannot fail to locate me, myself-are not needed to remove that uncertainty. the uncertainty they were introduced to eliminate cannot arise. this means that the dispositional differences we earlier noted that define an agent's perspective on the world may be enough to capture what is special about first-person belief. the idea that having a belief is like having a map of the world, for all its virtues, encourages the confused view that belief is in a way independent of action, as if an agent could have a map and not be ready to steer by it, for lack of knowing where she is in the world of that belief. i think this is incoherent. i do not mean that action is in fact prior to belief, as if an agent must first act in the world before she can have any beliefs, or as if we could make rational sense of an agent's acting independently of making sense of her having beliefs. self-locating actions are no more needed than are self-locating beliefs. My point, rather, is that belief and action are inseparable: belief is impossible without agency, and agency impossible without belief. our nature as believers cannot be understood independently of our nature as agents. Recognizing this requires recognizing that belief is a practical attitude, and not (or at least not just) a contemplative one. i have, however, only sketched what this could mean. 13 enDnOteS 1. i will not provide a thorough development and defense of a dispositional account of belief in this paper. But versions of it are defended by several philosophers : Cohen 1992; Marcus 1993; Audi 1994; Baker 1995; and schwitzgebel 2002 . But notice that everyone accepts (or ought to accept) that beliefs can make a difference to psychological explanation only if they make a dispositional difference. even functionalists about belief accept that. only someone who held that there is no essential link between belief and action would deny that beliefs make a dispositional difference. strawson (1994) develops such a view. A thorough defense of dispositionalism about belief would require, inter alia, explaining the difference between pretending that a is P and believing that a is P. i believe such an explanation can be given, and that important steps in the explanation are to be found in Anscombe (1958).
2. there is a debate over whether every property is dispositional. Mellor (1974) argues that all properties are dispositions. that idea is also defended in Goodman (1983) and disputed in Mackie (1977) . A middle position is defended in Quine (1974) .
3. though as a referee noted, knowing that Jones loves to play games while susan despises them may be helpful when planning a party to which both are invited. (2003) raises important doubts about just how good we are at predicting behavior and about the relations between predicting and explaining using belief ascriptions. Discussing her work would take me too far a field.
Andrews
5. sometimes, stories designed to show the existence of demonstrative beliefs actually involve differences in the truth conditional contents of an agent's beliefs. this is true of John Perry's influential story of an agent wandering the grocery store aisles wondering who is spilling sugar on the floor only to discover that he is the one spilling it (Perry 2000) . But the discovery that results in his having a belief that he would express using "i am the one spilling the sugar" involves gaining new factual information. For it is plausible to suppose that before his discovery the agent thought there were (or at least might be) two people wandering the aisles: himself and the one spilling the sugar. Part of what he learned in his discovery is a contingent fact about the number of wanderers; this discovery changes his map of the world. But only a case where an agent acquired the de se belief without gaining new factual information would clearly reveal the dispositional difference between the de se belief and the associated singular belief. For so long as there is a gain in factual information-so long as there is a change in an agent's map of the world-the accompanying dispositional difference can be explained by that new factual information-by the change in the map-and not by the acquisition of a special kind of demonstrative belief. i discuss this point in more detail in Hunter 2008. 6 . Christopher Peacocke makes the following strong claim: "no set of attitudes gives a satisfactory psychological explanation of a person's acting on a given object unless the content of those attitudes includes a demonstrative mode of presentation of that object" (Peacocke 1981, 205-206) . i am not sure just what a mode of presentation is. My account of the role demonstrative beliefs play in human action will not make reference to modes of presentation.
7. it would not be enough to claim that first person beliefs make a difference to action by having different effects than other singular beliefs but without differing dispositionally. For if it is of the nature of first-person beliefs to have such effects, then this just is the dispositional difference that first-person beliefs make. ; and setiya forthcoming. though these authors discuss the self-consciousness i have in mind, they do not conceive of it dispositionally, and do not relate it to belief revision and to demonstrative belief in the ways that i do. the ideas in this section are influence by the discussion of the first-person in Anscombe 1975. 9. A complication: in cases where i do X by doing y, it is possible to be unsure whether i am doing y. i might, for instance, be intentionally opening the struck tap by intentionally twisting on it, even though i am not sure whether i am succeeding at opening it. But it seems to me that this would be true only if i am certain that i am twisting the tap. i want to set this complication aside for now. For discussion of it, see setiya forthcoming.
10. velleman (2007) offers a causal account of the relation between first-person belief and the identity of intentional action.
11. For especially vivid presentations and clear discussions of this imagined uncertainty, see nagel 1986; Lewis 1983; and vendler 1984. 12. For recent discussion, see Falvey 2000; and Moran 2004. 13. i am indebted to anonymous referees at this journal for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. My thinking about first-person belief is indebted to many discussions over the years with Cara spencer. 
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